Daryl Kho PolSci 278 Final Essay: China’s Democratic Prospects 12/04/99

d-kho@uchicago.edu

The People’s Republic of China has always been a “democratic” nation. This astounding statement embodies the fundamental difference between the Western and Eastern notion of “democracy”, a distinction that must be grasped firmly before any prediction of China’s prospects for Western democratization can take place. Rooted in Confucian teachings, expounded by philosophers such as Liang Qichao, and exploited as justification for the sins of dictators like Mao Zedong, “Chinese Democracy” is one of the most, if not the most formidable obstructions to liberal democracy on the mainland.

The key to understanding the difference between “Chinese” or socialist democracy and “democracy” as the Western world knows it lies in the very fact that the mainland is referred to as the “People’s” Republic of China, as opposed to the “Person’s” Republic of China. The American version of democracy emphasizes the rights of an individual; tolerates and even encourages conflict and dissent in politics stemming from the antagonism of individuals and groups acting in self-interest[1]. The Chinese system, on the other hand, perceives the state to be a harmonious and natural aggregation of individuals, where private, selfish interests are suppressed for the good of society as a whole. According to Liang Qichao, one of the main proponents of this view, individuals’ rights were a substance that could be accumulated and added up into the powers of the state, which is at once greater than any single individual. Thus, it is not so much that a state is made up of a number of distinct and unique individuals; rather, “persons” are merely subunits of “the people”.

Man is a social being, and gains his existence due to society, that is, the state. The subsistence of the individual depends on the harmony and strength of society: without the state, no individual can exist. Thus, as elucidated by Confucianism, “selfish behavior was viewed as reflecting a failure to understand that one’s welfare was tied to a larger entity and as a futile attempt to isolate oneself” (Nathan 120). The individual should constantly attempt to cultivate and improve himself, striving to become the moral “superior man” (junzi) in order to contribute to the welfare of his family and country. Such a man was an individualist in that he followed his own moral convictions, but unselfishly social in the sense that he transcended his own selfish interests and labored not for personal glorification but for service to society. This was an individualism that involved personal sacrifice, as opposed to personal gain.

Democracy – rule by the people – through Chinese eyes came to be seen as a form of rule in the interests of the collective, where the individual is but a brick in the Great Wall of China. When society progresses, the social individual benefits accordingly. The welfare of the state therefore does not run counter to the interests of the individual; rather the collective good represents a higher, nobler form of individualistic interest. Under the influence of Darwinism and its application to international affairs, individuals might perish but their interests and purposes were served if their progeny, race or nation survived. As a means of gathering, focusing and unifying the collective energies of the people, Chinese or Socialist democracy was an ideal political structure. It would serve as a channel of communication between the state and its people, and as a vehicle for collective action to push China up the roost to the top of the global pecking order.

The people’s aspirations and ambitions should lie with the state, but when it does not, it is the fault of the people for being too uncultured to internalize higher purposes. If a country is inhabited by uncivilized, moral “small men”, with their self interests in conflict with those of the greater nation, then the natural harmony of people would never be realized and only chaos would ensue if such backward people were allowed sociopolitical freedom. If democracy is a rule by the masses, what would the fate be of a nation populated by fools? To grant civil freedom and democracy at this juncture would be akin to committing national suicide. As a disillusioned Liang Qichao realized after 1903, before outright democracy, uncultured and uneducated people must be first trained as citizens and taught civic consciousness. Pessimistic Confucianism likewise advocated long term indoctrination and internalization of social values, ideology and the virtue of placing the state before the person. Just like how training a puppy to “heel” first requires the use of a chain and physical restraint before finally setting it free to walk beside its master on its own “free will”, a form of “enlightened despotism” was necessary: a benevolent dictatorship that ruled in the public interest until conditions were ripe for democracy. Only when the people are civilized can Chinese/Socialist democracy realize its full potential. Just as how an untrained puppy would run away and never return when set free, Chinese democracy in the hands of barbarians could only mean social chaos, national destruction and with the end of the state – the death of individuals.

This rationale served as the basis that was used to justify authoritarianism and the acceptance of authoritarianism throughout China’s socialist era. Even though Mao Zedong denounced Liang’s ideas of reforms as bankrupt bourgeois ideology, the same rational was used to justify his terrifying campaigns like the Cultural Revolution, except that for Mao, collective interests meant national prosperity and the survival of socialism. Instead of economic strength, Mao wanted class struggle in the form of ‘contradictions’ in society that had to be struggled against. The idea that The People needed to be ‘taught’ correct citizenship was probably one of the major factors behind Mao’s love to be portrayed as the great teacher of the masses. Echoing Liang’s philosophies, “democratic centralism” came to mean “the discussion of an issue within the [Communist] Party [on behalf of ‘the people’] followed by unified implementation of whatever decision was reached at the top. The ‘mass line’ involved gathering information from the masses before making a decision, then persuading the masses to accept the decision…In no case were these procedures designed to encourage pursuit of personal or local interests or to achieve compromises among such interests” (Nathan 64). Because the peasant masses and the Party chose Mao to lead them to a better society in the Zunyi Conference of January 1935 after the Long March, Mao’s leadership and the Communist regime was effectively the choice of the People. After defeating the Kuomintang in 1949, the Communist Party became the embodiment of “the People.” Thus Mao assumed the role of the “benevolent dictator” or “enlightened despot” at the top, personifying the interests of the People, and guiding society toward a socialist democratic utopia:

“In a class of society, only after obtaining political power can

the ruling class, by means of the form of law, transform the will

of its own class into the will of the state, and rely on the coercive

force of the state to safeguard its own class interests” (Nathan 115)

Since man owes his existence to society, so the citizen owes his to the state. Liang Qichao thus defined civil rights not as individual claims against society (protection against the state) but as to power to do within and for society (Nathan 120). Communist China therefore only recognized “civil” or citizens rights that were created by the state and granted to its citizens. Since rights were created by the state, it had the authority to change, restrict and deny them in whatsoever way it judged “in the interests of the collective”, and since it did so by legislative enactment (under state control, of course), any state actions, however drastic and unfair, was deemed legitimate:

“If the purpose of granting rights is to elicit the individual’s contribution

to the nation, then it makes sense that the exercise of rights should be

limited, both by law and by the citizen’s morals, to actions that are

constructive. Since it is the state that grants rights and that channels the

energies that democracy releases, it is the state that can best determine where

the boundaries of constructive action lie. The use of rights for self-seeking

purposes cannot be part of their legitimate purpose, and may even be damaging

if it undermines the ability of the state to channel citizens’ energies in a unified direction.” (Nathan 128)

China under Mao Zedong was literally under a one-man rule. With his influence, demi-god status, and masterful manipulation of the “in the mass interest’” rhetoric, Mao’s power was virtually unparalleled. In 1957, Mao gave the “Hundred Flowers Speech”, encouraging people to express themselves, and subsequently the ‘Rectification Campaign’ of April 1957 which promoted the exposure and correction of factionalism, corruption and subjective idealism within the Party, confident that the “People” were now enlightened socialists ready to give constructive support. When the people actually began speaking out, however, Mao heard more criticism and dissent than he had bargained for, and launched the Anti-Rightist Campaign of June 1957 which cracked down harshly on opposition, accusing critics of seeking to “overthrow” the state. Since the Party represented the People, and since Mao dominated the Party, to speak against Mao’s liking was to speak against the People, and to incur Mao’s wrath was to be labeled a traitor of the masses, a bourgeois rightist, an enemy of the state.

The Cultural Revolution was testament to Mao Zedong’s incredible exploitative power over the masses and to fashion civil law in his favor. The decade-long ordeal Mao unleashed upon the populace from 1966 under the premise of sending a “cleansing fire” to “purify the ideological base” was merely a pretext for the purging of party members who had become too strong for his liking, such as Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi. After stirring up a mob of frenzied Red Guards and supporting their murderous momentum with statements like “Chaos is a good thing” or “Rebellious have justified reasons”[2] – when the turmoil had served its purpose and power was firmly in his hands once again, Mao reined in the demons he had unleashed, sending troops to forcefully reinstate order.

Since the constitution lay in his hands, there was nothing Mao could do that was unconstitutional. If Liberal Democracy meant constitutional protection for the freedom to oppose Socialist Democracy, it certainly did not exist during Mao’s rule, and continues not to exist from Deng Xiaoping’s rule to this very day.

When Mao died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping began his ascent to the top of the Party hierarchy. A victim of the Cultural Revolution himself (he was labeled a ‘capitalist roader’ and banished from the Party), it was clear to Deng that the unrestrained consolidation of state power into the economy and society was disastrous, hindering economic growth, increasing dissent among the People and causing general stagnation and even retrogression. Backed by reformers within the Party, Deng pushed forward a series of ideological positions and practical reforms that reversed the long-term [downward] trend, redefining the relationship between the party-state and the economy and society, and redrawing the boundary between public and private[3]. The symbolic turning point took place at the Third Plenum of 1978 where pragmatic orientations and practical policies that were labeled “reforms and openness” (gaige yu kaifang) were adopted (Tang 273). A major shift in ideology underpinned the reforms, “with the CCP moving from a dogmatic emphasis on the Maoist version of Marxism-Leninism to a pragmatic, market-oriented approach. Although the rhetoric of socialism [had] been retained (e.g. socialist market economy), the staunch, anti-market, anti-private initiative, anti-private gain focus [had] been removed”[4].

Deng faced the task of rebuilding China’s wrecked political system and reforming its backward economy simultaneously – both stark legacies of Mao’s rule. On the economic side, the disastrous rural communes that caused much of the Great Leap’s famines were dismantled from 1980 to 1982. The dual price system (with one planned price and another market price), instituted in place of a centrally planned single price, eventually gave way to a single market price system. Fiscal revenues were shared in a quota basis between lower-level and upper-level regional governments in a fiscal contracting system. By allowing local governments to keep extra-quota and extra-budgetary revenues from taxes and profits to themselves, local initiatives were significantly increased, providing local officials with incentives to foster local economic prosperity. Communist China for the first time in history opened its doors to the global economy, luring foreign direct investment with tax incentives, cheap labor and low overheads.

On the political side, there was significant interest among party leaders in rewriting party rules to prevent the rise of another Mao, although there was little agreement on how to restructure the state without reducing the power of the Communist Party[5]. Reforms were imperative for China’s dual transition into a less centralized political system and into a market economy. Without a redefinition of power (preferably constitutionally) among state apparatuses, “political decentralization would inevitably lead to increasing friction within [the state], while market oriented reforms would eventually encounter the institutional bottleneck of the old political system” (Pei 73).

Deng introduced the mandatory retirement of party and government officials and a two-term limit, preventing perpetuation of individual power, almost instantly “transforming a ruling elite dominated by poorly-educated, aging revolutionaries into one composed mostly of middle-aged technocrats” (Pei 71) with similar experience and political outlook, and making promotion more predictable and possible for ambitious young leaders.

One of the most important political changes was the rise of the National People’s Congress (NPC) from a rubber stamp into China’s supreme lawmaking body, posing a challenge to the Party’s monopoly of power. In November 1987, the NPC adopted the Organic Law of Village Committees, stipulating that the chairman, vice-chairmen, and members of village committees should be directly elected by the residents of the village[6]. Originally these elections were “designed to mobilize people to carry out predetermined party goals, to socialize them into official norms, and to legitimate the rule of the CCP” (Shi 395). This was an attempt to regain the party’s grip on the countryside, which was being loosened by the abolishment of communes and the increasing autonomy of local governments. Although the elections were organized and the candidates were chosen by the center, and even though manipulation was rife, once county officials realized that the elections increased local governability and once peasants became mobilized, the voices for reform grew louder:

“Peasants began realizing that the elections had a bearing on their welfare,

many began to nominate their own candidates to challenge local bureaucrats.

Some of them even lodged complaints with higher authorities about election

fraud. These developments drastically changed the balance of power between the

proponents and opponents of reform.” (Shi 402)

Hopes for a more democratic and liberal future among Chinese citizens accompanied these significant reforms. The Party under Deng’s leadership appeared to encourage the prospects for China’s democratization. In Febuary 1978, “a new constitution was adopted which spoke of popular supervision of government and guaranteed freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, demonstration and the freedom to strike, and…..the right to speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates and write big-character posters.” (Nathan 6). In May, two major party newspapers published a commentary entitled “Practice is the Sole Criterion of Truth”, calling into question the “ideological standard of strict adherence to Mao’s words”, “not to copy straight from Marx, Lenin, and Chairman Mao”, but to “seek truth from facts” (Nathan 7). An extremely significant development was a massive rehabilitation campaign, which reviewed and corrected the cases of victims of the Mao regime. Heroes were made out of those who had dared to remonstrate against Mao.

A democracy movement soon grew under such apparently nurturing political circumstances. Intellectuals posted essays and criticisms of the Mao regime on a wall near Tiananmen Square, which soon came to be known as the “Democracy Wall”. The central authorities at first seemed to encourage critical expression. Deng even announced that the “Democracy Wall is good”, and editorials were published with statements like “Let the people say what they wish…When people are free to speak, it means the party and government have strength and confidence” (Nathan 25).

However, echoing the Anti-rightist campaign and the Rectification campaign that preceded it – as well as the Cultural Revolution – the liberal atmosphere soon came to an abrupt end. Deng’s temporary endorsement of the movement in late 1978 was politically motivated, having to do with the power struggle within the Party. It was politically useful to have his rivals denounced by the masses in posters and demonstrations, and to have the backing of “the People” for his rule, which promised political reform, liberalization and economic growth. However, once his status as supreme leader was confirmed, the democracy movement now posed a threat to his control. Deng charged the dissidents with misusing the pretext of democracy to sow discord among the people in a conspiracy to overthrow the People’s Republic. According to him, “Ultrademocrats” were presenting the state with selfish, unreasonable demands without consideration for collective interests- radicals in the opposite spectrum as the “Gang of Four” during the Cultural Revolution. Deng laid down “Four Basic Principles” that no exercise of democracy could contradict. These were the Socialist Road, the Proletarian Dictatorship, the Communist Party dictatorship, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Effectively, it was the same as telling the people that they could be as free as they wanted to be, as long as they remained shackled. This proved to the disappointed Chinese that despite a loosening of Marxist ideology, Deng’s government retained Mao’s unflinching belief in Socialist Democracy. The only thing that had changed was that Deng believed that it was the Communist Party as a whole that embodied “the People”, and not a single individual like how it was under Mao. There could still be no opposition party, no alternative political system, but the present Communist one.

Hence even with economic liberalization and political reform, the Chinese Communist regime still maintained the socialist derivation of “democracy”, and relied on its rhetoric to justify its dictatorship, along with any authoritarian measures needed to protect its rule. The principles of “Socialist Democracy” and “Democratic Centralism” once again poured into the media, drowning the populace with waves of propaganda:

“Democracy cannot be unlimited or absolute. The kind of democracy we

need is socialist democracy, or democracy enjoyed by the overwhelming

majority of the people. We don’t need bourgeois democracy, which enables a

handful of people to oppress the majority of the people. The interests of the

majority are defined by Deng’s ‘Four Principles’. So long as one upholds them,

one is free to express any opinions.” (Nathan 34)

The Democracy Wall was closed off, and Deng demanded the cancellation of the constitutional right to hang wall posters. Again, since the state granted rights to the citizens, it was legally sanctioned to take civil rights away as it saw fit. In October 1979, Wei JingSheng, the most outspoken and infamous of the democracy activists, was brought to trial and charged with leaking confidential state information (which was actually public knowledge) to foreign reporters and publishing counterrevolutionary statements (he criticized Deng Xiaoping and called for liberal democracy), and was sentenced to 15 years in prison. His prosecutor told him “our constitution stipulates that you have freedom of belief, and that means you may believe or disbelieve Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, but it also states you are definitely forbidden to oppose it- for opposition is a violation of the constitution” (Nathan 34). Deng defended the party against the claim that free speech and political participation enable the people to correct party mistakes with the acknowledgement that “our party has made serious mistakes, but they were always corrected by the party itself, not by any other force” (Nathan 37). Only the party was allowed to undo party wrongs, for anything other than the party to attempt to do so would be tantamount to rebellion against and betrayal of the People.

The mainland regime continues to maintain the ethos of “Socialist democracy” to the present day, reaffirming its stance with vivid brutality in the forceful suppression of student-led demonstrations in the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989. What then, are the prospects for China’s liberal democratization?

Resulting from the reforms, a range of forces have been unleashed that are increasing the pressures for real change. For one, as a result of decentralization (e.g. fiscal contracting), local governments have increased in autonomy, economic leverage and political support. The gradual decline of the personal authority of national leaders especially in rural China (due to the dismantling of communes and increasingly popular local elections) has weakened the reach of the Communist Party at the grassroots level of government. And as the private economy has expanded, the ability of the central government to monitor and control local economic behavior has reduced dramatically (Montinola 72). With increasing marketization, the momentum for reform has increased, making attempts at reversal and recentralization increasingly difficult. In order to maintain economic growth, the government will have to rely on its booming private sector as its primary engine. To fuel this growth and to continue attracting and keeping foreign investment, the central is under increasing pressure to provide a system of secure private property rights, a commercial law, and an independent judicial body. Because economic agents know “in advance that political discretion affords no protection for their economic success, they are unlikely to put their effort and wealth into undertakings that put them at risk” (Montinola 50). With the entry of China into the WTO, China will become subject to international standards of commercial law, and the government will have to gradually release the final vestiges of its foothold in the economy – state-owned enterprises – from the under the wings of state protectionism into the competitive realm of the free-market.

The CCP is also “governing a society radically different from the one at the end of the Cultural Revolution- a society much less dependent on the state and party, more open to new values, and less susceptible to the traditional ideological approach” (Pei 79).

Due to the onset of the Information Revolution, increasing globalization and increasing prosperity, China’s citizens will know more, want more, demand more and accept less. The greater the awareness of individual rights and freedoms available to the Chinese relative to those available to the rest of the world’s citizens, the weaker the credibility of “Socialist democracy” and the weaker the crutch for authoritarianism will be. Driven to starvation by the Great Leap disaster, terrorized by the Cultural Revolution, let down by the Democracy Movement, and crushed by the Tiananmen Massacre, the people have increasingly little reason to believe in the empty promises of a socialist utopia. A long and sincere process of social healing on the part of the Party will be needed to regain the hearts of the masses.

Because the principle of Socialist Democracy denies the rights of the individual and denies the existence of opposition, it is the greatest obstacle to liberal democracy. If the Party stubbornly decides to cling on to its monopoly on power and its ideology of socialist democracy, it faces the worst-case scenario of a gradual decline and an ultimate collapse. Who can say that from the ashes of rebellion, a better government will rise? The Chinese have seen too many bloody revolts, only to find themselves responsible for enthroning a greater evil. Since outright democratization is impossible and a political revolution is undesirable, a better alternative would be for the party itself to lead the changes in political reform and eventual overhaul. On the part of the Chinese people, more patience is required. Like the reformers who sought to bring about sequential change through constant pressure within the government, and unlike the student protesters who demanded the immediate end of the Party, perhaps the best way to destroy an enemy, is to make him a friend. Change should probably come from within, and the Chinese people should not only appreciate and accept that, but also continue to nudge into their leaders a gradual rethinking of the meaning of “democracy”. Gradually, civil society should strengthen and develop with autonomous, legal institutions “that not only can help to run social affairs but also can be politically and socially responsible actors in society” (Tang 321). Progressively, the Party will be led by civic-minded, morally conscious liberals. In time, the People’s Republic of China might truly become a republic for the Chinese people.

Bibliography

Nathan, Andrew J., Chinese Democracy, University of California Press (Berkeley, Los Angeles), 1995

Yang, Benjamin, Deng: A Political Biography, M.E. Sharpe (Armonk, New York), 1998

Tang Tsou, “The Tiananmen Tragedy”, in Brantly Womack, Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 1991)

Montinola, Gabriella, Qian, Yingyi and Weingast, Barry R., “Federalism, Chinese style,” World Politics, October 1995

Pei, Minxin, “Is China Democratizing?” Foreign Affairs 77:1 (1998)

Shi, Tianjian, “Village Committee Elections in China,” World Politics 51 (April 1989)

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[1] Nathan, Andrew J., Chinese Democracy, University of California Press (Berkeley, Los Angeles), 1995. p.ix

[2] Yang, Benjamin, Deng: A Political Biography, M.E. Sharpe (Armonk, New York), 1998. p165

[3] Tang Tsou, “The Tiananmen Tragedy”, in Brantly Womack, Contemporary Chinese Politics in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 1991) p273

[4] Montinola, Gabriella, Qian, Yingyi and Weingast, Barry R., “Federalism, Chinese style,” World Politics, October 1995, p52

[5] Pei, Minxin, “Is China Democratizing?” Foreign Affairs 77:1 (1998), p73

[6] Shi, Tianjian, “Village Committee Elections in China,” World Politics 51 (April 1989), p385